Descartes

Descartes

Thursday, October 5, 2023

On Illusions, Dreams, and Evil Geniuses

In the process of defeating skepticism, Descartes constructs three of the most famous skeptical arguments in philosophical history.  For this comment, explain ONE of those arguments and assess whether it works or not.  Are these arguments defeasable -- or does Descartes bite off more than he can chew?

7 comments:

  1. In Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes is celebrated for his skeptical arguments aiming to establish a foundation for knowledge. The “Dream Argument” stands out prominently, in which Descartes posits that no definitive signs can unequivocally differentiate between waking and dreaming states. We often perceive our dream experiences as tangible and real, only to dismiss them upon waking. This raises a question: what if our waking moments, too, are mere figments of a prolonged dream? Thus, in the absence of a credible mechanism to discern dreams from reality, our faith in the senses falters, compelling us to question the very fabric of our perceived reality and the knowledge it creates.
    Descartes used 'methodical doubt' not to reject all knowledge but to find a solid foundation for it. His solution was the assertion: "Cogito, ergo sum" ("I think, therefore I am"). This cogito became the bedrock upon which knowledge could be reconstructed, a beacon of certainty undiminished by even the most pervasive skepticism. Yet, while affirming the existence of the thinking self, the cogito doesn't vouch for the validity of our knowledge of the external world.
    However, by emphasizing the individual thinker, Descartes might have unintentionally promoted a self-centered view of knowledge. This has inherent limitations and raises many questions: How does one reconcile the realm of individual thought with objective reality? How can we ensure our introspective perceptions correspond to an external, shared truth?
    While Descartes' Dream Argument is compelling and effectively instigates skepticism, it isn't insurmountable. Philosophers succeeding him, equipped with empirical and pragmatic lenses, crafted rebuttals to this skepticism. Notably, John Locke and David Hume championed empiricism, advocating knowledge extraction and validation through sensory experiences, even while conceding their imperfections. Concurrently, pragmatists, represented by thinkers like William James, postulated that beliefs merit assessment based on their pragmatic outcomes rather than their incontrovertibility. Yet, Descartes' foundationalist approach to skepticism was not universally lauded. Coherentists, for instance, contended against foundationalism. They propounded that our beliefs aren't anchored in immutable foundations but gain legitimacy from their coherence within a broader belief network.
    However, it's essential to underscore that while we might grapple with certainties, our sensory and cognitive faculties provide us with belief systems that are pragmatically effective. The authenticity of these beliefs isn't inherently flawed—after all, they manifest in a world palpable to our senses.
    Descartes' foray into skepticism was revolutionary. It reshaped philosophical paradigms and etched the trajectory for modern epistemology. His Dream Argument and the cogito formed a strong defense against deep skepticism. Nevertheless, it opened floodgates to intricate inquiries about the essence and origins of knowledge. This legacy, with its mix of support and criticism, still influences today's philosophy, showing Descartes' impact over time.

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  2. Descartes’ evil genius argument is successful in proving his idea of the Cogito, but works against his argument as a whole, becoming the work's pitfall. The existence of God is an important building block from which Descartes builds arguments in Meditations on First Philosophy, but in one of his most provocative skeptical arguments to date, he introduces the idea of an evil genius. An intentional deceiver, the evil genius is all-powerful, similar to a traditional god, that casts everything Descartes could believe into doubt.

    To make his argument, Descartes first claims that an all-powerful evil genius is possible, because it is not an internal contradiction (which in Medication I, II and III he defines as the criteria for possibility). If this being is all-powerful, then naturally, he/they/it is capable of deception. Although God, according to Descartes’ understanding of it, would not deceive us, since he/they/it is “all good,” an evil genius is not “all good” and could, at any time, be deceiving us. If we cannot be certain that there is an evil genius, then everything we perceive could be a deception and we have no knowledge.

    First brought up in Meditation I, Descartes used the evil genius as a tool to cast into doubt all long standing opinions he held from childhood. His reasoning being that the only way to attack these innate opinions (that kept coming back to him), was to assume everything was deception until he could prove that they were certain. Here Descartes develops the idea of the Cogito - that because he knows he thinks, he must exist. The Cogito is where the idea of an evil genius meets an adversary. An evil genius doesn’t generate doubt that I am thinking and therefore must exist. Not even an all-powerful being can make me think I exist when I don’t, because that would require me thinking, which means I exist. I cannot exist and not exist at the same time, it is an impossible internal contradiction. If I think that I think, but I am actually not thinking, then I necessarily must be thinking and not thinking at the same time: again impossible. Clearly then, the evil genius argument cannot be so skeptical as to prove I do not exist. Descartes points out this pitfall in Meditation III and this is likely why he included the evil genius- to help prove the Cogito.

    By introducing this evil genius idea, Descartes opens up a whole can of worms that he, in my opinion, doesn’t seal up well enough. Since I agree with the argument that sets up the possibility of an evil genius, I now require an argument that completely disproves that, and I never get that. The evil genius idea firmly ends the argument at Meditation II or the Cogito; I am certain that I exist, but of nothing else. He never sufficiently proves that an evil genius does not exist, simply that there is a possibility that there is a God who is not a deceiver. This again is confusing, is Descartes trying to say that there is a chance both could exist at once, that one necessarily erases the other, or that they could somehow work together? We are left with only proof that both can exist, and a clear inclination from Descartes that an all-good god is what we have, but again with no proof. Even if coherence can prove I am awake, nothing can prove that ideas regarding the nature of things and the material world are true. The argument for the possibility of the existence of an evil genius is too strong and the arguments disproving it, are too weak. The internal contradiction argument for the possibility of anything is strong, and if something is possible, we must treat it as if it is present. Descartes’ evil genius argument’s strength works against the whole work, whether he intended it or not.

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  3. In Descartes’s first meditation, he comes up with the “Dream argument”, which has him question all of his foundational beliefs. He reasons that, while he is dreaming, his dreams are indistinguishable from reality. Since dreams are indistinguishable from reality, it is impossible to determine with certainty whether one is dreaming or awake. This gives Descartes reason to doubt his senses, as they deceive him by making his dreams seem like reality. Because Descartes senses have deceived him, he has reason do doubt all of his senses, and since all of his beliefs are supported by his senses, he has reason to doubt all of his beliefs.
    But does Descartes’s dream argument work? Much of this argument’s stability rests on the first premise, stating that dreams are indistinguishable from reality. Some may argue that their dreams are not as clear as their current sensory experience. People are also able to vividly remember their experiences while awake, but not while dreaming. Although dreams are not as coherent as our experiences when awake, there are cases that give indisputable evidence that one’s mind can believe it is in a different reality while dreaming. An example is when someone wakes up in a cold sweat after a nightmare, where they believed their life was in danger when it truly was not. Although the nightmare may not appear clear or as tangible as reality, it reveals that the senses can be deceiving, which is a point Descartes uses to question all of reality.
    By accepting the first premise, one must accept that the senses can deceive us. If this is the case, the dream argument holds true and is feasible. Some may argue that just because the senses can deceive once, does not mean they are deceiving the rest of the time. It is important to acknowledge that this could be true, but the point of the dream argument is to show that it is possible that all of reality and what the mind senses is a falsity. All that is required for this to be possible is to reveal that the senses, the very basis for everything the mind believes, can be false. This may not be probable, but Descartes reveals that it is possible.

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  4. Have you ever woken up in a dream and gotten ready for school or work only to hear your alarm ring again? Many have experienced the sensation of waking up within a dream or not being able to distinguish their dream state from reality. Philosophers and thinkers alike have pondered these scenarios for centuries.

    In Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes famously proposed his skeptical arguments regarding dreams. Using the aforementioned scenarios, he claims there are “no definitive signs by which to distinguish being awake from being asleep”(Descartes 14). Here, he claims that we cannot distinguish reality and a dream state. His argument can be better formatted below:

    1)One can be asleep in their home, but their senses and dreams make them believe they are in another place, at another time outside their own
    2)If you can't distinguish between dreams and reality, it's possible to be in a dream
    3)If you don’t know if your dreaming, one cannot know anything about the external world based of perception
    4)We have no knowledge


    Structurally, his argument makes sense. Although its soundness can be tested against his own ideas mentioned later in the text. After proposing his dream argument, he reverts to evident, indubitable truths of mathematics to dissuade his skepticism. Descartes asserts “awake or asleep, two plus three makes five, and a square does not have more than four sides”(15). The irrefutable mathematical truths poke holes in the claim that we cannot possess knowledge. If awake or asleep, we can undoubtedly recall truthful information, we can possess some capacity of knowledge. However, I am not the only one to question the soundness of Descartes' argument. Famous philosophers like Stroud, Hobbs, and Locke proposed counter-arguments to Descartes' dream ideals. If I have no knowledge, this paragraph doesn’t matter, although if I do, I’ll claim that for now this argument is unresolved, like many topics in philosophy.








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  5. Fair warning: this comment most likely misrepresents the ontological argument for God’s existence, as the author does not fully grasp the argument at time of writing.

    In Descartes’ “evil genius” argument, he reaches the skeptical conclusion that he has no knowledge by acknowledging the possibility of an all-powerful evil genius/god existing. Because this god is evil, it could want to deceive us, and because it is all-powerful, we could be deceived about everything and not be aware. Thus, we cannot be sure that we have knowledge.
    While seeming ludicrous and far-fetched at first glance, this skeptical argument makes sense on a logical level. As long as the possibility of an evil god can be imagined, it is possible that it could exist. As long as this possibility exists, the scenario can be true, and a person can doubt whether any of their beliefs are true. Thus, as an anti-skeptic, Descartes is forced to refute the evil genius argument.
    Unfortunately, Descartes fails to fully refute this argument. First with his famous Cogito thesis, he presents the maxim that as long as he is thinking, he knows he exists, since something that does not exist cannot think. However, this doesn’t actually get around the evil genius argument in a meaningful way. Although Descartes’ foundationalist philosophy aims to find a set of beliefs that do not require justification, the Cogito fails to do this because even if someone can prove they exist, the evil genius can still create everything outside of their existence. Secondly, he fails to universally prove that God isn’t evil and thus wouldn’t give him false knowledge. Next, with his ontological argument, Descartes argues that certain concepts exist that have properties that don’t need to be proven in the physical world, but can rather be intuited (e.g. properties of a triangle). Thus, God existing in Descartes’ mind with the property of being supremely perfect means that God’s actual existence has these qualities. However, the ontological argument has a few immediate errors. First, it is not clear how God occupies the same theoretical space as mathematical concepts – just from observation, people are much more likely to share the same beliefs about basic math than they are about the existence of a God/gods. In short, it’s not guaranteed that everyone will go through the same thought process of imagining a god that Descartes did, so God may not exist for everyone. Following this, someone could imagine a god that is supremely evil instead of perfect. All of this means that the evil genius argument still has some possibility of being true.
    To summarize, Descartes’ “evil genius” argument presents a compelling case for skepticism, and Descarte is not able to completely defeat its implication and prove that knowledge exists.

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  6. Descartes hit upon a really good point in this meditation. The validity of this argument lies in the fact that all beliefs are reliant upon senses. When nitpicking the argument, there are some instances of fault. For instance, when one is lucid dreaming, they have full control of the dream, as well as their understanding that they are dreaming. This one nuance case, however, isn't the downfall of this argument. The real problem lies in Descartes's claim about the senses. Firstly, there are some senses that one for sure knows they are experiencing. In dreams, it is almost impossible to experience immense pain, taste food, or sweat and feel wet. In a dream, one can almost never experience a real-life cramp, and go through that immense pain. Because of this, certain beliefs can always be trusted. One can always trust that a cramp after football practice will hurt, or that when they sweat, they will feel wet.

    Secondly, just because one’s senses deceive in one instance, it doesn’t mean that in all instances this occurs. If i go into ym house and feel as if I am selling bread, and am really just smelling something like a candle, it doesn't mean I shouldn't trust my smell if I smell a fire. Knowledge isn't only attainable by absolute truths but rather can be informed by absolute beliefs. Believe I can see well and can smell fresh baked bread and fires, and therefore can know what I am smelling for certain.

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  7. Descartes' Dream Argument, one of his famous skeptical arguments, challenges our confidence in the reliability of our sensory experiences. The argument follows that since it is challenging to determine a dream from awake or even prove you are dreaming in the first place; it is impossible to prove if you are asleep or awake at any moment. Likewise, with this inability to prove your state of being, you can't trust your senses, as if you were in a dream your senses would only be an illusion of reality, therefore, we know nothing. However, as relatable as it is, I believe this argument falls short of providing an airtight case for skepticism.

    Primarily, certain aspects of knowledge appear to be immune to the Dream Argument. For instance, mathematical truths and logical reasoning don't rely on sensory experiences and hold regardless of whether we are awake or dreaming. If you were to conceive the formula for the Pythagorean theorem in your head, that formula still exists, even without a physical reality to base it upon. Knowledge like 2+2=4 or the Pythagorean theorem is not contingent on the external world or the current state of our sensory experiences. These mathematical facts are true regardless of whether we are awake or dreaming because they are grounded in pure reason and logical consistency. This means that even if we were to doubt the external world's existence, mathematical truths remain self-evident and certain within the realm of thought.
    Similarly, logical reasoning operates independently of sensory experiences. Deductive and inductive reasoning, the rules of formal logic, or even Descartes' own methodical doubt, can all be applied and evaluated within the confines of thought. Whether awake or dreaming, the principles of logic and reason provide a framework for evaluating the validity of arguments and drawing rational conclusions.
    This resilience of abstract knowledge in the face of the Dream Argument suggests a foundational level of knowledge that can serve as a bedrock for other forms of knowledge. Descartes himself recognized this when he asserted "Cogito, ergo sum" (I think, therefore I am), grounding his existence in the act of thinking, a form of abstract reasoning that does not rely on sensory experience.

    In conclusion, while Descartes' Dream Argument raises profound doubts about the reliability of our senses and the external world, it is not an insurmountable challenge to knowledge.

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